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ABSTRACT. Common-sense functionalism is taken to entail a version of the extended 
mind thesis, according to which ones dispositional beliefs may be partly constituted by 
artifacts. As several opponents of the extended mind thesis have objected, claiming so 
can generate a cognitive/knowledge bloat, according to which we may count as knowing 
the contents of trusted websites, even before looking them up (!). One way to retain 
common-sense functionalism, but avoid the ensuing cognitive/knowledge bloat worry 
is to introduce epistemic presentismi.e., the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and 
that we can only believe, and thereby know, things in the present. Independently of the 
above problem, epistemic presentism can be further motivated by shedding light on two 
central epistemological questions: (1) how to understand the distinction between doxastic 
and propositional justification and (2) how to interpret the closure principle. The view 
also aligns with strong intuitions about what we may take ourselves to know, what the 
relation between action and belief is, and what may count as part of our minds. 
1. INTRODUCTION
If I ask whether you know what you had for breakfast, all you need to do is think about 
it and then respond. But how about five minutes or even five seconds ago, when the 
matter had not even crossed your mind? To deny that you knew back then would 
certainly be odd. 
And yet, if we want to retain otherpossibly strongerintuitions (that we dont 
know all the phone numbers stored in our SIM cards, for example) or, even, hold on to 
the commonsensical understanding of our minds that seems to underlie all such 
intuitions, denying that you knew what you had for breakfast when the question had not 
2been brought to your attention may actually be advisable. But how can such a puzzle 
even arise? Curiously enough, the reasons for restricting our knowledge in time can be 
brought into light by attempting to extend our knowledge in space. 
In a less enigmatic tone, the present target is the existence of dispositional 
beliefsbeliefs that are not presently occurrent. While positing such non-occurrent 
beliefs is commonplace within philosophy, it has also turned out to be particularly 
problematic. The reason as we shall see is that, from the common-sense functionalist 
point of view, it is a small step from claiming that there are dispositional beliefs to 
claiming that we know the contents of our smartphones, laptops or websiteseven 
before looking them up. Assuming, however, that this cant be true and that we are not 
willing to reject common-sense functionalism, it is likely that the idea of dispositional 
beliefs may have to go. 
Consequently, we will here consider the alternative of epistemic presentismi.e., 
the view that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can only believe (and thereby 
know) thoughts that are presently occurrent. Before we further expand on the idea itself,
however, a bit more needs to be said about how we may end up with it.       
2. EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE
Consider the extended mind thesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2007, 2008). 
According to this form of active externalism (Hutchins 1995; Theiner 2011; Wheeler 
2005; Menary 2006, 2007; Rowlands 1999; Wilson 2000, 2004), mental statesbeliefs, 
desires, emotions, and so oncan be extended beyond the boundaries of the organismic 
agent. 
To motivate this claim, Clark and Chalmers (1998) need only invoke common-
sense functionalism (Braddon & Jackson 2007) according to which, mental states and 
processes are just those entities, with just those properties, postulated by our everyday 
common-sense folk psychology.1 Consider the following thought experiment: Otto is an
Alzheimers patient who compensates for his failing memory by always carrying a well-
organized notebook. In order to claim that Otto believes a piece of information inscribed 
1 Active externalism has also appeared in the literature under two more formulations: (1) The extended cognition 
hypothesis (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998, Chemero 2009, Froese et al. 2013, Palermos 2014) and (2) the distributed 
cognition hypothesis (Sutton et al. 2008, Theiner et al. 2010, Tollefsen & Dale 2011, Hutchins 1995), both of which 
focus on distributed cognitive processes (as opposed to mental states). Several authors (Chemero 2009, Froese et al. 
2013, Sutton et al. 2008, Theiner et al. 2010, Tollefsen & Dale 2011, Palermos 2014, 2016b) have recently noted that, 
due to their focus on cognitive dynamics, the extended and distributed cognition hypotheses can be backed up by 
dynamical systems theory (DST), which means that they can be motivated independently of the common-sense 
functionalism that underlies typical arguments for the extended mind thesis. 
3in his notebooksay that MOMA is on 53rd streeteven before looking it up, Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) compare him to a normal subject, Inga. Upon hearing about an 
interesting exhibition, Inga thinks, recalls that the museum is on 53rd street and starts 
walking to the museum. Clark and Chalmers argue that if one wants to say that Inga had 
her belief before consulting her memory, one must also accept that Otto believed the 
museum was on 53rd street even before looking up the address in his notebook. This is 
because the two cases are functionally on a par; given our everyday, common-sense 
understanding of how memory works 
[] the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga; the 
information in the notebook functions just like the information [stored in Ingas 
biological memory] constituting an ordinary non-occurrent [i.e., dispositional] belief; it 
just happens that this information lies beyond the skin (Clark & Chalmers 1998, 13).2
Furthermoreto strengthen their pointClark and Chalmers spell out the 
relevant commonsensical intuitions by noting that, just as in the case of biological 
memory, the availability, portability and reliability of the resource of information are 
functionally crucial in determining whether a piece of information can qualify as ones 
dispositional belief. Specifically, they suggest, in order for an externally stored piece of 
information to be included into an individuals mind, the following criteria must be met:
1) The resource [must] be reliably available and typically invoked.
2) Any information thus retrieved [must] be more-or-less automatically 
endorsed. 
2 An anonymous referee worries about my claim that in order to motivate the extended mind hypothesis, Clark and 
Chalmers need only invoke common-sense functionalism. The referee objects that Clark and Chalmers need to also 
invoke the Parity Principle, which states the following: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a 
process which, were it go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, 
then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process (Clark and Chalmers 1998, 8). The 
assumption that the Parity Principle is an additional step in Clark and Calmers argument is a common mistake within 
the literature on the extended mind hypothesis.  As Clark (2007) and others (e.g., Menary 2007; 2010) have clarified, 
the Parity Principle is merely an intuition pump that restates the basic functionalist premise: that so long as a process 
realizes a function that we would accept as a specific kind of cognitive function, then we should not worry about the 
material realisers of that cognitive process, or, in the case of cognitive extension, where these realisers are located. The 
Parity Principle is about equality of opportunity. It is about avoiding a rush to judgment based on spatial location 
alone. (Clark 2007). In other words, the Parity Principle is only meant to guard against spatial prejudice when deciding 
whether a process may qualify as a cognitive process. Common sense functionalism, which judges a process to be of a 
particular cognitive kind solely on the basis of the function it serves, already presupposes that the location of the 
processjust as its material realisersshould be of no concern. (Tellingly, Clark and Chalmers do not argue for the 
Parity Principle. Instead, they assume that should one accept common-sense functionalism then one should also accept 
the Parity Principle.) It is therefore incorrect to assume that satisfaction of the Parity Principle is an additional step in
the argument for the extended mind hypothesis, over and above employing common-sense functionalism. 
43) [Any] information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and 
when required. (Clark 2010, 46)3
Now, given that memory is normally thought to support knowledgememory, 
according to the received view, can both generate and store knowledgewe can project 
the extended mind thesis (as motivated by common-sense functionalism) to 
epistemology with the following result: Ottos knowledge is extended in the sense that he 
knows MOMA is on 53rd street even before consulting his notebook, just as Inga does 
even before engaging in recollection.4 In other words, on the basis of common-sense 
functionalism, we must treat Inga and Otto on a par, which is to claim that they both 
possess dispositional beliefs that amount to (dispositional) knowledge.5
3. A TRILEMMA
There is a problem with extending our minds and knowledge in this way. The above 
common-sense functionalist criteria can be far too easily satisfied, thereby leading to 
unwelcome results. Many critics are suspicious even of the Otto case, but it is easy to 
generate numerous other counterexamples. Rupert (2004, pp. 401405), for example, 
notes that a case similar to Otto is the case of a person who has access to a phonebook, 
or a directory service, through the use of her cellular phone. Nevertheless, it is
counterintuitive to conclude that the phonebook, or the directory service allows her to 
have non-occurrent true beliefs about (or knowledge of) the phone numbers of everyone 
whose number is listed. 
In other words, if any externally stored information that satisfies the above 
criteria were to count as a dispositional belief of ours, we would be led to a knowledge 
bloat, whereby our belief-systems would appear to leak in implausibly many directions 
3 This paper has been available online since 2006. These criteria, however, date even earlier as they had already made 
their appearance in (Clark & Chalmers 1998) (although the phrasing was somewhat different). Also, in (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998, 17), the authors consider a further criterion: Fourth, the information in the notebook has been 
consciously endorsed at some point in the past, and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement. As the 
authors further note, however, the status of the fourth feature as a criterion for belief is arguable (perhaps one can 
acquire beliefs through subliminal perception, or through memory tampering?), so they subsequently drop it.
4 As Rupert (2004, 403) notes, if we allow for Ottos beliefs to extend, then similar remarks would apply to his 
knowledge. 
5 Within the literature there is an alternative way to account for extended knowledge. According to this alternative, 
which draws on the combination of the extended cognition hypothesis with virtue reliabilism (see Pritchard 2010a, 
Palermos & Pricthard 2013, Palermos 2011; 2014; 2015; 2016a) knowledge extends not in the sense that beliefs extend, 
but in the sense that justification extends: The involved artifacts are proper parts of the cognitive abilities that reliably
produce/justify the agents true (occurrent) beliefs.
5(Clark, 2001; Rowlands 2009). 6 Farkas (2012), for example, gives the additional 
counterexample of Lotte who has downloaded 37 volumes of the history of Europe with 
a quick search function from a source she completely trusts, and Lynch (2014) warns us 
that, by the extended mind reasoning, we may turn out to know much of the information 
online.7
Now, to fully appreciate the problem we are facing, it should be noted that the 
above version of the extended mind thesis is actually taken to be a consequence of 
common-sense functionalism. Consider for example Weiskopf (2008) who submits that 
functionalism has all along been committed to the possibility of extrabodily states 
playing the role of beliefs and desires (267) and Sprevak (2009) who takes such 
problematic cases of the extended mind thesis to constitute counterexamples to 
functionalism.8 In other words, if we want to treat Inga and Otto on a parsuch that we 
hold fast to common-sense functionalismwe must accept the knowledge bloat and the 
ensuing epistemic explosion. Otherwise, we must reject common-sense functionalism. 
Indeed, a possible way to deny the functional parity between Otto and Inga is to 
give up common-sense functionalism for a different kind of functionalism. To see how 
this strategy works, consider Rupert (2004) who argues that Ottos way of recalling 
information is essentially different to biological memory to such an extent that the two 
information-retrieving mechanisms cannot be both treated as mental processes. 
Specifically, as Rupert notes, retrieving information from the notebook does not seem 
likely to exhibit the negative transfer and/or the generation effects which are typically 
manifested in the process of recalling information from biological memory.9 This is 
indeed a promising strategy for rejecting the claim that Inga and Otto are functionally on 
a par. The problem however is that it comes at the cost of giving up common-sense 
functionalism for what is known as psycho-functionalism. 
Psycho-functionalism claims that mental states and processes are just those 
entities, with just those properties, postulated by the best scientific explanation of human 
behaviour. Therefore, contrary to common-sense functionalism, the information used in 
6 The relevant problem was initially called the cognitive bloat worry, but since all known examples of the problem 
concern outsourced propositional attitudes rather than lower level cognitive processes, it is perhaps more accurate to 
refer to it as the problem of knowledge (or, at least, doxastic) bloat. 
7 Though, interestingly, by invoking Clark and Chalmers fourth criterion (see fn. 3), Bjerring and Pedersen (2014) 
argue in favor of such cases of extended knowledge.  In places, they even consider dropping this extra criterion and 
biting the bullet of the ensuing knowledge bloat. 
8 Sprevak does not distinguish between the hypothesis of extended cognition and the extended mind thesis. Most of 
his counterexamples, however, involve extended dispositional beliefs and therefore concern the extended mind thesis. 
9 Negative transfer is a particular form of interference effect, which appears when past learning detrimentally effects 
the subjects capacity to learn and remember new associations. The generation effect on the other hand is a 
mnemonic advantage of subjects who generate their own meaningful connections between pieces of materials learned. 
For more details see (Rupert 2004).
6the functional characterization of mental states and processes needn't be restricted to 
what is considered common knowledge or common sense, but can include information 
available only by careful laboratory observation and experimentation. For instance, 
Ruperts resistance for treating Inga and Otto on a par invokes the negative transfer and 
generations effects, which are not part of our everyday understanding of how memory 
works but can only be revealed through careful scientific theorising and experimentation. 
Invoking such fine-grained details in categorising mental states and processes 
would indeed block the functional parity between Inga and Otto. However, this 
approach invites a different problem. By focusing on fine-grained, human specific details 
about human psychology, psycho-functionalism is open to the charge that it is overly 
chauvinistic (Block 1980), because creatures whose internal states share the rough, but 
not fine-grained, causal patterns of ours wouldn't count as sharing our mental 
states. Unsurprisingly, it is precisely this problem for psycho-functionalism that Clark 
puts his finger on, in his reply to Ruperts objection against the case of Otto: just 
because some alien neural system failed to match our own in various ways (perhaps they 
fail to exhibit the generation effect during recall []) we should not thereby be forced 
to count the action of such systems as noncognitive (Clark 2008, 114-5).  Therefore, if 
we wish to avoid this form of human-specific chauvinism, we must retain common-sense 
functionalism. By doing so, however, we are back to square one with respect to the 
problem of Otto and Inga and the ensuing cognitive/knowledge bloat. 
Yet, there might be another way to avoid this problem, while still retaining
common-sense functionalism. Specifically, a possibleyet surprising solutionwould be 
to claim that neither Inga (and thereby) nor Otto possess dispositional beliefs or 
knowledge of the relevant propositions, because there are no dispositional beliefs. This is 
a surprising solution, because it would amount to answering negatively to the question 
we opened with and would lead to what we may here dub epistemic presentism: The view 
that there are no dispositional beliefs and that we can therefore believe and know those 
and only those propositions that are presently occurrent. 
In other words, we face the following trilemma: 10
10 The following list of options is not necessarily exhaustive, as there are some (less obvious) alternative paths one 
could take (therefore, strictly speaking, the following is not a trilemma). Wikforss (forthcoming), for example, has 
attempted to block the Otto and similar cases by enhancing common-sense functionalism with the addition of an 
alternative criterion. It is not clear, however, whether her additional criterion (i.e., automatic direct interaction with 
other informational states) is not met by some of the existing information storing devices or even by Ottos notebook. 
Also, Gertler (2008) offers another alternative out of the problem by claiming that only occurrent states belong to the 
mind. This may sound close to epistemic presentism but, as we shall see in §5, it isnt. 
71. Reject common-sense functionalism
2. Accept knowledge bloat
3. Accept epistemic presentism
Despite the fact that option (1) has been widely debated in the literature (e.g., Block 
1980, Chalmers 1996, Churchland 2005, Weiskopf 2008 and Sprevak 2009), the 
foregoing suggests that there are good reasons for retaining common-sense 
functionalism, and option (2) can be rejected as obviously unwelcome.11 Accordingly, the 
remainder of the paper sketches the alternative of epistemic presentism in order to assess 
its relative plausibility.
4. EPISTEMIC PRESENTISM
As the name suggests, epistemic presentism is the idea that we can only believe and know 
thoughts that are presently occurrent. The reason is that there are no dispositional beliefs 
but only occurrent ones.12 Consequently, neither Otto nor Inga know the location of 
MOMA before looking it up, because the relevant information is not occurrent there 
and then for either of them. This is, of course, not to deny that they have known it other 
times in the pastif, say, they happened to entertain the same thought at some other 
moment, or when they first encountered the relevant piece of information (which is why 
it is inscribed in Ingas biological memory and Ottos notebook).  But in the interlude of 
these moments neither of them knew. 
If we allow for this, then we can both claim that Inga and Otto are functionally 
on a par and avoid the ensuing knowledge bloat: We cant possibly know the contents of 
our notebooks, phonebooks, the internet or what have you without looking them up, 
simply because we do not believe them. And the reason why we dont believe them is not 
because they are externally stored but because they are not presently occurrent. 
The problem, of course, at least in Ingas (and any other purely biological) case is 
how to account for the rest of the memories we have in the background of our minds. 
If they are not dispositional beliefs, what are they? To answer, we can here borrow 
Audis (1994) notion of dispositions to believethough note that Audi does not introduce 
11 Though cf. (Bjerring and Pedersen, forthcoming). 
12 Prima facie, there is no reason why epistemic presentism couldnt apply to every kind of belief we may possess. 
Consider, for example, Stevensons (2002, 118) six categories of belief: (1) non-linguistic, object directed, (2) non-
linguistic, mind-directed, (3) linguistic, object directed and unreasoned, (4) linguistic, mind-directed and unreasoned, (5) 
linguistic, object directed and reasoned, and (6) linguistic, mind-directed and reasoned.  
8the relevant idea to replace dispositional beliefs (which is what we will here do), but in 
order to explain what dispositional beliefs are not. According to Audi, both dispositional 
beliefs and dispositions to believe have adequate psychological bases (meaning that in 
order for their content to be entertained, anything that is required is already present 
within ones psychology). But the difference between the two is how directly available 
they are: The suggested difference between a dispositional belief and a disposition to 
believe is in part that between accessibility of a proposition by a retrieval process that 
draws on memory and its accessibility only through a belief-formation process (ibid., 
420), where, according to Audi, the latter is understood either as an inferential or a 
mediational process. Put another way, although in both cases the constituents of the 
relevant belief are already present within our minds, dispositions to believe are yet to be 
formed whereas dispositional beliefs are antecendently held. 
This is an interesting distinction. Epistemic presentism, however, goes a little 
further by claiming that beliefs cannot be antecendently held, which is, in effect, to deny 
the existence of dispositional beliefs altogether. No matter whether a piece of 
information is directly or indirectly available, if it belongs to our memory, then it is a 
disposition to believe. Of course, following Audi, there is little doubt that there should 
be a distinction between inferentially and non-inferentially available dispositions to 
believe, such that only the latter may count as parts of our memories. According to 
epistemic presentism, however, our memories contain only, and are systems of, 
intertwined dispositions to believe. 
Interestingly, at one point, even Audi himself entertains the thought that 
explaining actions requires only dispositions to believe, and that the distinction between 
these and dispositional beliefs is largely artificial (425).13
5. INDEPENDENT MOTIVATION AND INTUITIONS
According to epistemic presentism, beliefs can only be occurrent and any other 
proposition we are inclined to assent to is not a dispositional belief but merely a 
disposition to believe. Is this move only motivated by the trilemma we considered in §3 
or can there be independent grounds for it? Moreover, how intuitive is it really? To ease 
ourselves into epistemic presentism, we may consider two further points that can be 
13 Despite this remark, however, Audi is still skeptical of this assimilatory move, whose proponents, he notes (fn. 16), 
are Cohen and de Sousa: Belief that p.is a disposition to feel it true that p . You answer the question whether you 
believe that p by introspecting or reporting what you are disposed to feel about the matter (Cohen 1989, 368). Bp is a 
disposition to assent (de Sousa 1971, 25).   
9offered in its support (both of which are of epistemological interest). Then, we can also 
assess how appealing the view is by testing it against our intuitions. 
The first point concerns the import of epistemic presentism to grasping one of 
mainstream epistemologys central distinctions, lying at the heart of the internalist 
approach to epistemology (Poston 2007). I am referring to the distinction between being 
propositionally and doxastically justified in believing p: 14
Doxastic Justification
S is doxastically justified in holding p only when S holds p by possessing reasons R for p 
and S believes p in virtue of those reasons R. 
Propositional Justification
S is only propositionally justified that p only when S possesses reasons R for p such that 
were S to believe p in virtue of R she would also be doxastically justified, but either S 
doesnt believe p at all, or believes p but for the wrong reasons. 
The reason for drawing attention to this distinction is becausein the absence of 
epistemic presentismit is hard to see how we can make sense of it in practice. To see 
what the problem is, let us assume that our memories countcontra epistemic 
presentismas (dispositional) beliefs. Let us also assume that one, at some point, comes 
to believe reasons R for p. If thats the case, then how is it possible for one to be
propositionally but not doxastically justified in believing p? How is it possible for one to
believe that p, believe reasons R for p (i.e., be propositionally justified in believing that p)
and still fail to believe p in virtue of (at least also) ones propositional justification?15
14 For original formulations, see (Kvanvig 2003), (Pollock and Cruz 1999) and (Swain 1979). I here define 
propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification though Turri (2010) questions which of the two (doxastic 
or propositional justification) should come explanatorily first. Letting this issue aside, I am here interested in the 
distinctions very existence. 
15 In other words, how it is possible to believe/know ones reasons for some proposition p and fail to believe/know p 
(at least also) in virtue of these reasons? Lehrers (2015) Mr Raco is a recent attempt to provide just such a case: Mr 
Raco is initially a racist who believes that the members of some race are susceptible to a disease that the members of 
Mr Racos race are not. As it happens, after a while, Mr Raco becomes a doctor and, as a result, acquires evidence that 
his racist conviction is in fact correct. So far so good, but Lehrer wants us to further imagine that, after all is said and 
done, Mr Raco keeps holding his initial belief not on the basis of the newly acquired scientific evidence, but because of 
his initial racist prejudice. In other words, Mr Raco is not doxastically justified in his racist belief, because he does not 
hold it on the basis of his propositional justification. On my part, I find this hard to imagine. While it is certainly 
plausible to think that Mr Raco may now hold his initial belief for both reasons (which is why he would still qualify as a 
racist, despite the fact that he also holds scientific evidence for the target proposition), I do not see how he could 
concurrently believe both reasons for his racist belief but still fail to hold it on the basis of both of them at the same 
time. To my knowledge, Lehrer provides no reasons why we should reject this (arguably) more plausible alternative 
over his assessment of the thought experiment.  
10
By contrast, if we adopt epistemic presentism, we can easily make sense of the 
above by claiming that it is only in the case of being doxastically justified that one 
believes p in virtue of believing ones propositional justification that p; in cases of believing 
p while only being propositionally justified for p, ones propositional justification is not 
believed, but it is instead a mere disposition to believe.16 As Turri (forthcoming, 2) notes, some 
put the distinction in terms of justifiable versus justified belief, and we might also 
put it in terms of being in a position to justifiedly believe versus justifiedly believing.
The second point concerns the idea that knowledge is closed under known 
entailment, which is usually formulated this way: 
Closure Principle
If S knows that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. 
Given, however, epistemic presentisms insistence that knowing (in the present) is not 
quite the same as being disposed to know (diachronically), the above classical 
formulation of the closure principle is ambiguous between the following four principles:
1. If S has the disposition to know that p, and S has the disposition to know that p entails q, 
then S merely has the disposition to know that q.
2. If S has the disposition to know that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S merely has 
the disposition to know that q.
3. If S knows that p, and S has the disposition to know that p entails q, then S merely has 
the disposition to know that q.
4. If S knows that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q.
Principle 4 is of particular interest here. Firstly, it is seemingly identical to the classical 
formulation except that, this time, it carries the very specific meaning that all the relevant 
propositional attitudes are occurrent. Secondly, and as a consequence of the previous 
16 So, with respect to Mr Raco, the way to make sense of Lehrers assessment of the case would be the following: Mr 
Raco may only hold his racist belief for racist reasons aloneeven when he possesses internally accessible scientific 
evidence for itif Mr Raco does not believe, but is only disposed to believe the relevant scientific evidence. In this 
case, Mr Raco would only be propositionally but not doxastically justified.  
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point, it is this and this principle alone that allows S to know (as opposed to being merely 
disposed to know) the entailed proposition q.
Why is this important? Within mainstream epistemology it has been recently 
noted that the classical formulation of the closure principle is not valid on all possible 
readings, because it fails to ensure that the subject believes q on the basis of the relevant 
entailment: Maybe, during the process of carrying out the relevant deduction, S forgets 
that p and/or the entailing proposition, or comes to believe q on entirely independent 
(and insufficient) grounds. If anything of the sort happens, then no more do we have the 
intuition that S knows that q.
Accordingly, several epistemologists (Williamson (2000, 117); Hawthorne (2005, 
29); David & Warfield (2008); Pritchard forthcoming)) have insisted on reformulating the 
closure principle like this:
Competent Deduction Closure
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q, thereby forming a belief that 
q on this basis while retaining her knowledge that p, then S knows that q.
How does this refined formulation avoid the above error possibilities? The answer is that 
it makes explicit that, in order for S to know that q, all knowledge alluded to in the 
classical formulation must be occurrent.17 This is a relatively uncontroversial point but, in 
the context of the present discussion, it can be particularly interesting. The reason is that 
this is the same point we made above on the basis of epistemic presentism. Accordingly, 
one might further claim, the debate over the interpretation and reformulation of the 
closure principle vindicates epistemic presentism, in light of which there is only one way 
to read the classical formulation of the closure principle, which has been correct all 
along.18
17 An anonymous referee worries that, contrary to my claim, the competent deduction principle is an improvement to 
the classical formulation of the closure principle, not because it makes explicit that all knowledge should be occurrent 
but because it makes explicit that the relevant inference should be competent. After all, one might draw incompetent 
inferences from occurent beliefs. The anonymous referee is correct to point out that inference should be competent. 
However, the above formulation of the principlewhich stresses that knowledge of the entailing proposition should 
be retainedmakes it obvious that epistemologists have been mostly worried about the possibility that one could 
loose knowledge of the entailing proposition while drawing the inference. Pritchard (forthcoming) is explicit about this 
in his discussion of the competent deduction closure: Since competent deductions are diachronic processes, it is also 
important to specify that the subject retains her knowledge in the entailing proposition throughout. For if the 
knowledge in the entailing proposition is lost during this process (perhaps as a result of the process itself), then clearly 
there is now no longer the same intuition that the entailed proposition should be known.
18 It may be objected here that even on the epistemic presentist reading of the closure principle (but not on the 
competent deduction closure), Ss belief that q could be based on something other than the entailment in play. 
However, just as in the case of propositional justification (see the discussion on the propositional/doxastic justification 
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Now, to move on, even though the preceding discussion may fall short of a full 
account of epistemic presentism, it should be sufficient for showing that the view may 
qualify as a working hypothesis, which can be motivated independently of the problem it 
was initially called to resolve (i.e., how to retain common-sense functionalism while 
avoiding the ensuing cognitive/knowledge bloat worry). A crucial withstanding question, 
however, is how well it can fare with respect to our intuitions.  
To start with phenomenology, consider Audi again who notes that dispositions 
to believe are as temporally immediate as dispositional beliefs (despite the fact that, on 
his view, the former are always indirect). There is, however, a deeper phenomenological 
issue, which springs from the fact that we feel as if we did know what we had for 
breakfast five minutes ago and that, in general, we do believe a vast number of things 
other than the things we believe here and now.  
Interestingly, the answer to such an objection may come from considering the 
phenomenology of another knowledge-conducive belief-forming processthat of visual 
perception. No one would deny that visual experience is sharply focused, uniformly 
detailed, colourful and high in resolution. But, in fact, outside the high-resolution, foveal 
region at the centre of our eyes, resolution drops dramatically and we are nearly colour-
blind. 
To confirm this take a deck of cards. Fix your gaze at some point straight ahead 
and without moving your eyes pick a card. Extend your hand with the card to your side 
while still fixating straight ahead. As you start moving the card towards the centre of 
your visual field you will notice that something is moving in the periphery, butif you 
dont cheatyou wont be able to tell what colour it is until it has been moved within 
twenty or thirty degrees from the centre of your visual field.19 Or consider the page you 
are now reading. Stare at a word or phrase. Without moving your eyes, how many other 
words can you distinctly make out? If you attend carefully, youll notice that you can 
make out very few of the other words, even directly above or below the fixated word (Noë
2004, 49). Clearly, the periphery of our visual field is nothing like it is in the centre, and 
yet we perceive no difference at all.
According to Noë, this is simply an illusion produced by the fact that wherever 
we look, we encounter detail. The ability to have as much detail as we want, whenever we 
want itsimply by taking a lookmakes us feel as if weve had it all along. Even though 
above), it seems impossible to believe/know ones reasons for some proposition p and fail to believe/know p (at least 
also) in virtue of these reasons. (See also fn. 14).
19 The effect is much more impressive with a deck of Uno cards where there are more than just two possible colors 
one can guess from. 
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the detail is not actually but virtually present, the phenomenological effect is the same. As 
Minsky writes, We have the sense of actuality when every question asked of our visual 
systems is answered so swiftly that it seems as though those answers were already there 
(1958, 257). Accordingly, to experience detail virtually, you don't need to have all the 
detail in your head. All you need is quick and easy access to the relevant detail when you 
need it (Noë 2004, 50).
Similarly, the epistemic presentist may suggest, in order to have the impression 
that you knew what you had for breakfast all along, you do not really need to have had 
any dispositional beliefs or knowledge about the matter. All you need is quick and easy 
access to the relevant information as requiredsomething, which, according to Audi, is 
satisfied by both direct and indirect dispositions to believe.20 Accordingly, our impression 
that we possess dispositional beliefs and knowledge may only be an illusion created by 
the fact that, at any moment in the past, we could have had easy and virtually immediate 
access to the corresponding information.21
In this way, epistemic presentism seems able to accommodate the 
phenomenology of our doxastic and epistemic experience. But can it handle our grasp of 
our minds and ourselves equally well? Do we really want to deny the existence of 
dispositional beliefs both for Otto and Inga, thereby possibly confining our minds in 
what is presently occurrent? Clark and Chalmers are well aware of how unappealing this 
might be:
To consistently resist this conclusion [(that Ottos dispositional beliefs extend)], we 
would have to shrink the self into a mere bundle of occurrent states, severely threatening 
its deep psychological continuity. 
This is a forceful rhetoric indeedthough one the proponent of epistemic presentism 
may again escape. To see how, it could help to focus on a crucial difference with Gertler 
(2008) who, in an attempt to avoid overextending the mind, decides to bite the bullet and 
limit the mind to occurrent, conscious states and processes. As she writes, some 
internal (standing) beliefs and (nonconscious) cognitive processes are non-mental.
20 Moreover, notice how Clark and Chalmers criteria are designed to capture precisely this aspect of our 
phenomenology.
21 A similar story can be said with respect to second person knowledge attributions. Say someone asks: Do you know 
what time the epistemology reading group starts?, and you reply: I am sorry, I dont, but Helen does, why dont you 
give her a call?. It seems natural to say that Helen knows, even though she is probably not currently entertaining the 
thought in question and thereby is not, according to epistemic presentism, in a position to know. The reason, 
according to the above line of thought, is that, were we to ask her, she would have immediate access to the 
corresponding information, as if she knew it all along. 
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This may sound close to epistemic presentism, but it is not. Contrary to Gertlers 
view, the proponent of epistemic presentism is not committed to identifying the whole 
of the mind with consciousness. While the epistemic presentist insists that one only has 
occurrent beliefs in the present (denying in effect the existence of dispositional ones), 
there is no reason to deny that nonconscious dispositions to believe (and other 
nonconscious cognitive processes) can be proper parts of ones cognitive system. In 
order to block the knowledge bloat worry, which is based on our intuitions on what one 
may believe, all that is required is to rule out the possibility of dispositional beliefs
(extended and non-extended alike).22 Cognition, however, does not need to be confined 
in what is presently occurrent or within our heads. Accordingly, there is no reason to 
claim that dispositions to believe cant be parts of ones character and mental 
repertoireeven if, under the appropriate conditions, some of them may extend in space 
as well as in time. 
6. OBJECTIONS AND CLARIFICATION
Let us then consider some possible objections, the answer to which may help us 
understand what epistemic presentism entails and what not. To start with, a threatening 
worry is that accepting epistemic presentism actually amounts to rejecting common-sense 
functionalism. Proponents of the latter view after all appeal to dispositional beliefs 
rather frequently, such that denying their existence would seem like going against the 
letter of common-sense functionalism. 
Despite its force, it is not hard to dispel this initial objection. To do so, we only 
need to remind ourselves that common-sense functionalism, as a general approach to 
philosophy of mind, holds that mental states and processes are just those entities, with 
just those properties, postulated by our everyday common-sense folk psychology. As 
22 An anonymous referee worries about my appeal to intuitions with respect to what one may believe. Specifically, by 
treating the view that there are dispositional beliefs as an intuition makes it easier to abandon it. Instead, if we treated 
the existence of dispositional beliefs as an empirical hypothesis, then the view would not be as easy to abandon on the 
face of epistemic presentism. In response, there are two reasons why the existence of dispositional beliefs may be seen 
as an intuition. First, given the current state of cognitive science, which is nowhere close to explaining the nature of 
dispositional beliefs, their existence, at least for the time being, is precisely thatan intuition. Secondly, due to 
eliminative materialism (see for example Churchland 1981 and Churchland 1986), dispositional beliefs might only be 
part of our intentional stance (Dennett 1989). According to this view, dispositional beliefs can only be seen as 
conceptual abstractions, which though real are not candidates for straightforward reduction or elimination as the result 
of cognitive science research. Accordingly, the existence of dispositional beliefs may fail to qualify as an empirical 
hypothesis, even in principle. Whether eliminative materialism is true such that we would have to resort to the
intentional stance or whether the existence of dispositional beliefs could one day count as an empirical hypothesis, the 
aim of the present paper is to demonstrate the viability of epistemic presentism as an alternative to the view that 
dispositional beliefs existeither as an alternative intuition in the logical space of our conceptual analysis of common-
sense functionalism or as an alternative full-fledge empirical hypothesis (depending on whether eliminative materialism 
is true or false). 
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anyones everyday interactions with friends and relatives may testify, however, 
dispositional beliefs is a concept that no layperson ever appeals to. Dispositional beliefs 
is a technical term (perhaps first introduced by the dispositional theory of belief 
(Braithwaite 1932-3)) that forms no part of our common-sense, folk psychology. 23
Accordingly, denying the existence of dispositional beliefsas the epistemic presentists 
docannot really count as a rejection of common-sense functionalism itself. 
Nevertheless, apart from this general worry with respect to the compatibility 
between epistemic presentism and common-sense functionalism, there might be a more 
technical concern, which has to do with the specific functional role that occurrent and 
dispositional beliefs are supposed to play. The functional role of beliefs, in general, is to 
cause and explain action. Specifically, beliefs, in conjunction with desires, rationally 
explain an agents actions, where an agents actions may be physical as well as mental (as 
in the case where ones belief that p leads one to form the further belief that q). As far as 
occurrent beliefsor, according to epistemic presentism, beliefs simpliciterare 
concerned, there should be no problem. So long as a belief is presently occurrent, the 
causal relation between the agents belief, desires and actions (whatever that might be) 
will be the same both for opponents and proponents of epistemic presentism. In order 
for there to be a tension between the two views, opponents of epistemic presentism 
must further claim that, sometimes, a number of beliefsway more than the 
psychological limit on how many beliefs can be occurrent at any given momentcan 
have an effect on our actions. In other words, opponents of epistemic presentism must 
claim that dispositional beliefs play a functional role that is similar to the role of 
occurrent beliefs, such that removing the former from our ontology is going to create a 
functional hole: What could possibly play their role instead?
To respond, the claim that dispositional beliefs can have an effect on action is 
rather ambiguous, because it is open to the following three interpretations. (1) It may be 
23 It has been suggested to me that the claim that the notion of dispositional beliefs forms no part of our common-
sense, folk psychology may be too quick. We often say things like she believes that Brazil will win the World Cup, or 
he still believes in Santa Claus without intending to imply that the subject is thinking about the World Cup or Santa 
Claus at the moment. While this is certainly true, I fail to see how such sentences demonstrate that common-sense 
psychology presumes the notion of dispositional beliefs but not the notion of dispositions to believe. Note that 
these sentences are formulated in the simple present tense, which is used to refer to an action or event that takes place 
habitually. Therefore, the above examples can be interpreted as indicating that whenever the subject is asked or thinks 
about the relevant matters, she tends to believe (in the present) that Brazil will win the World Cup or that Santa Claus 
exists. In other words, such sentences cannot vindicate the inclusion of dispositional beliefs over dispositions to 
believe in our common-sense psychology and claiming so would, in the face of epistemic presentism, beg the 
question. The common-sense functionalist status of dispositional beliefs could only be established on the basis of 
expressions such as she dispositionally believes that Brazil will win the Wold Cup. I have never heard of expressions like 
this. 
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the strong claim that dispositional beliefs (along with the relevant desires) guide actions 
directly; (2) it might be the weaker claim that dispositional beliefs have an indirect effect on 
the agents actions by acting as the background against which the agents occurrent beliefs 
take their shape from; and (3) it might be the still weaker claim that dispositional beliefs 
can indirectly affect an agents actions by disposing the agent to act in certain ways 
(provided, of course, that the relevant desires are also present). 
If it is the third and weakest claim, then we can simply follow Audi who, as we 
noted above, suggests that dispositions to believe can explain action equally well as 
dispositional beliefs. Specifically, we may claim, dispositions to believe can explain and 
be responsible for subsequent actions not by causing them directly, but by priming or 
attracting the agent to a space of possible occurrent beliefs and the actions that these 
beliefs may lead to. This is a space that is idiosyncratic of that specific agent and it is 
shaped precisely by what that agent is disposed to believe. 
This much, of course, should be relatively uncontroversial. But what about the 
stronger claims? Admittedly, claiming (1)that dispositional beliefs can have a direct effect
on action, in pretty much the same way that occurrent beliefs dois going to be rather 
puzzling for the epistemic presentist, who denies the existence of such dispositional 
beliefs. Nevertheless, it is not easy to see how the opponent of epistemic presentism is 
going to fare any better. How exactly can a beliefthat is not presently occurring
guide an agents actions directly, there and then? 
Perhaps, what the proponent of dispositional beliefs has in mind is not claim (1) 
but claim (2)that dispositional beliefs guide actions indirectly by acting as the 
background against which the agents occurrent beliefs are formed, and from which they 
also take their shape. If thats what the claim amounts to, however, then it seems that the 
most promising way to accommodate it is not going to provide an argumentative edge to 
either proponents or opponents of epistemic presentism. 
I am referring to Brandoms semantic inferentialism (2008), according to which 
the meanings of our propositional attitudes are derived by a web of inferential 
commitments, in a web of other propositional attitudes. For example, believing that there is 
a falafel in ones dish, commits one into believing that the dish is vegetarian, which in 
turn commits one into believing that the dish has no meat in it... which further commits 
one into believing that it contains no rabbit, duck, beef, pork and so on. 
Accordingly, we can use Brandoms view in order to demonstrate how ones 
background propositional attitudes (no matter whether they are dispositional beliefs or 
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mere dispositions to believe) can strongly affect ones actions, even if not in a direct way. 
For example, one who presently believes (1) that eating animals is wrong and (2) that the 
dish in front of him is venison may refrain from eating what he has been served on the 
basis of just these two occurrent beliefs. If Brandom is correct, however, the content of 
the agents occurrent beliefs, which also determines their effect on his subsequent 
actions, is also informed and guided by the following two inferential commitments (amongst 
others): (1) That venison comes from deer and (2) that deer are animals. In other words, 
according to Brandom, propositional attitudes are nodes in a wider inferential structure 
and their content as well as the kind of actions they can lead to depend on their position 
within that structure.  Crucially, however, Brandom talks about this structure as a web of 
commitments, without specifying whether such commitments are supposed to be 
dispositional beliefs or mere disposition to believe. Accordingly, in order to account for 
how dispositions to believethough not beliefs themselvesmay have a strong, yet still 
indirect, effect on ones actions, it is open to the epistemic presentist to incorporate 
Brandoms view into her own, in the same way that the proponent of dispositional 
beliefs may have to do, in order to address the same concern with regards to 
dispositional beliefs. According to Brandoms semantic inferentialism, mentally available 
propositions can have an indirect yet pervasive effect on ones (occurent) beliefs by acting 
as the structural background against which those beliefs are formed and take their 
content from. 
Of course this is not to say that epistemic presentism is necessarily committed to 
semantic inferentialism. Perhaps there can be alternative ways to explain how 
propositional attitudes other than the ones that are currently believed can have an 
indirect effect on ones actions. But if one wants to explain how actions can be indirectly
motivated by more than just what one presently believes, then it is open for one to 
employ semantic inferentialism, independently of whether one is an epistemic presentist 
or not.
It appears then that epistemic presentism is in a position to deal with most 
functionalist worries. Before concluding, however, it is important to clarify one last point 
concerning the functional profile of beliefs. Since all conscious beliefs are also occurrent, 
why not simply claim that beliefs can be only those propositional attitudes that we are 
conscious of? As tempting as this suggestion may be, the answer is that even though 
some occurrent propositional attitudes are unavailable to consciousness, some of them 
may still qualify as beliefs or even knowledge. For example, consider Armstrongs (1968) 
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claim about driving absentminded: Most of us at some time have had the rather 
unsettling experience of coming to after having been driving on automatic pilot, while 
our attention was elsewhere directedperhaps having been day-dreaming or engaged in 
intense conversation with a passenger. But, while we were not conscious of most of our 
experiences related to driving, it would be strange to claim that we did not know that the 
traffic light was red in all these crossroads that we stopped or that it was green when we 
kept going. If anything, these were reliable beliefs that did guide action directly, even if 
nonconsciously so. 24 It seems, therefore, that our beliefs may be occurrent even if 
nonconscious, and epistemic presentism should be clearly distinguished from the 
stronger claim that all beliefs must be consciously entertained.25
So, how does epistemic presentism understand the difference between the 
functional role of beliefs and that of dispositions to believe? One easy response, which 
has been assumed from the very beginning, is that beliefs are presently occurring, whereas 
dispositions to believe are not. But what does it really mean for a belief to be presently 
occurring? 
The preceding discussion indicates the following: Independently of whether a 
proposition is consciously entertained or not, it may only count as presently occurring
and thereby as a beliefif and only if it can guide an agents actions directly, there and 
then. This is what is required from a proposition p in order for the corresponding agent 
to come to know another proposition q, when q is known to be entailed by p; it is also 
what is required from an agents reasons R with respect to a proposition p in order for 
the agent to be doxastically as opposed to merely propositionally justified in holding p;26
likewise, it allows a driver to count as knowing that the light was green even if the driver 
had never been consciously aware of it; and, returning to the puzzle we opened with, it 
also provides a promising way for retaining common-sense functionalism in the face of 
the epistemic bloat worry.27
24 Moreover, in relation to the above discussion on semantic inferentialism and the effect of beliefs and dispositions to 
believe on guiding action, such actions may be driven by a number of mentally available proposition such as that there 
is a highway code; that all drivers should respect the code; that according to the code, drivers should stop at red 
lights and pass with green lights, etc. According to epistemic presentism, however, such propositions can only count 
as dispositions to believe, as it would be implausible to claim that they directly guide our actions, every time we sit 
behind the wheel. Instead, the only beliefs that seem to have a direct effect on driving behavior are beliefs such as the 
light is green or the light is redeven if they are only subconsciously entertained.  
25 Allowing nonconscious occurrent states to count as beliefs is another significant difference between epistemic 
presentism and Gertlers (2008) view, which limits the mind to what is strictly conscious. 
26 Here we must not forget that drawing an inference on the basis of a belief is just another form of (mental) action.
27 In closing, we can offer one more point in favor of epistemic presentism: Avoiding treating knowledge (and beliefs 
in general) as dispositional mental states seems to also be in line with the general approach of virtue reliabilism within 
contemporary epistemology. For reasons having to do mostly with Gettier cases and the value of knowledge (see 
Pritchard 2010a, §2.4; Pritchard 2010b; Greco 2008, Greco 2010) virtue reliabilists treat knowledge as a cognitive 
achievement. Ontologically speaking,, Mourelatos (1978) has argued that achievements fall under the topic-neutral 
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6. CONCLUSION
Common-sense functionalism appears to overextend our knowledge, unless we accept 
epistemic presentismunless, that is, we are willing to hold that there are only presently 
occurrent and no dispositional beliefs. This is a provocative move, and some would 
rather give up common-sense functionalism instead. On further reflection, however, 
epistemic presentism may not be as counterintuitive as one may have initially thought, it 
can be motivated on entirely independent epistemological grounds and it also has the 
resources to deal with several demanding challenges that may be launched against it.
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